Introduction:
In a significant ruling impacting the computation of custody and statutory bail in multiple connected criminal cases, the Telangana High Court examined whether the period of judicial custody in one offence can be treated as custody in all other related offences arising out of substantially similar facts. The case, titled Dr. Athaluri @ Pachipala Namratha vs. State of Telangana, involved a doctor accused of engaging in surrogacy-related offences allegedly involving fraudulent activities, forged documents, and illicit monetary dealings. The petitioner contended that multiple FIRs registered by the Gopalapuram Police Station pertained to the same chain of events and thus, her custody in the earliest FIR—dated 27.07.2025—must be considered as custody for all subsequent connected crimes. The Trial Court, however, refused to treat the initial remand as applicable to subsequent cases, leading to the denial of default bail in Crime Nos. 99 to 102 of 2025. The petitioner challenged this approach, arguing that the period of custody must be computed from the date she was first remanded, thereby entitling her to default bail under Section 167(2) of the CrPC, now replaced by Section 187(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS). Justice N. Tukaramji of the High Court examined the statutory mandate, constitutional principles of liberty, and judicial precedents including Tupakula Appa Rao vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, wherein it was held that custody in one case shall be deemed custody in all connected cases arising from the same facts and police station. The Court ultimately recognised that the omission of the investigating agency to formally reflect remand in subsequent FIRs constituted negligence, prejudicing the petitioner’s statutory right to default bail. This judgment underscores critical procedural safeguards protecting the liberty of an accused and restricts investigative authorities from circumventing statutory deadlines through artificial arrests or staggered remand processes.
Arguments of the Petitioner:
The petitioner, represented by Senior Counsel Nagmuthu assisted by Soma Srinath Reddy, argued that she was implicated in numerous offences registered at the Gopalapuram Police Station, all stemming from the same or substantially similar set of facts concerning surrogacy-related activities. According to the petitioner, the alleged offences related to surrogacy arrangements—though recorded as separate crimes—formed one continuous series of events. Therefore, once she was taken into custody in the first case on 27.07.2025, that date must be treated as the date of custody for all other connected cases. The essence of the argument was that judicial custody in the first FIR cannot be compartmentalized or artificially split by registering multiple FIRs to extend remand periods indirectly.
The petitioner contended that statutory bail under Section 187(3) BNSS, earlier Section 167(2) of the CrPC, provides an indefeasible right once the statutory period for investigation expires without the filing of a final report. For offences carrying sentences surpassing ten years, the statutory period is ninety days. The prosecution’s failure to file a charge sheet within this timeframe mandates the release of the accused, irrespective of the nature or seriousness of the allegations. Thus, the petitioner insisted that since the ninety-day period had elapsed from the date of her first judicial remand, she was entitled to default bail.
To reinforce her argument, the petitioner relied on Tupakula Appa Rao vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, where it was held that custody under one FIR extends by implication to other connected FIRs involving the same cause of action. If the authorities fail to formally show arrest in connected crimes, such omission cannot prejudice the rights of the accused. The High Court in that case clarified that custody is not merely physical confinement but a legal status governed by judicial control. Thus, maintaining multiple FIRs without corresponding remands cannot restart the statutory clock in each case.
The petitioner further highlighted that the Trial Court had already granted statutory bail in Crime Nos. 94, 96, and 97 of 2025 following the same principle. The denial of bail in Crime Nos. 99 to 102 was inconsistent, arbitrary, and violative of her right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. The petitioner also pointed out that the prosecution could not evade statutory deadlines by choosing not to show the remand in subsequent cases, especially when all charges were part of a singular fraudulent surrogacy mechanism.
The petitioner emphasized the procedural rights enshrined under the BNSS, asserting that default bail is not a judicial concession but a legislative mandate ensuring that the state does not prolong incarceration without diligently completing its investigation. The failure to file the charge sheet within the mandated timeline, despite having the accused in custody, must necessarily lead to bail. Hence, the petitioner prayed that she be released on statutory bail in the remaining FIRs.
Arguments of the State:
The prosecution, represented by M. Ramachandra Rao, Additional Public Prosecutor, opposed the petitioner’s plea, contending that although the crimes shared a common thematic connection—the misuse of surrogacy—each FIR concerned distinct victims, events, and contractual relationships. According to the State, these offences did not constitute a single series of acts but multiple independent criminal transactions perpetrated by the petitioner under the larger umbrella of surrogacy.
The State asserted that the petitioner had allegedly induced different individuals at different times through deceptive representations relating to surrogacy arrangements, thereby obtaining illicit financial benefits. Since each transaction involved separate victims and separate elements of fraud, each FIR had to be independently investigated. Consequently, the remand and custody accrued in one FIR could not be mechanically extended to another, because every offence required different evidence, witnesses, and investigative trajectories.
The prosecution maintained that viewing all cases as one continuum would undermine the integrity of criminal investigations and embolden offenders to commit serial offences under the presumption that custody for one would dissolve liability for others. The State argued that the petitioner’s attempt to merge distinct offences into a single proceeding was an attempt to benefit from procedural technicalities and frustrate ongoing investigations. The prosecution emphasized the gravity of the offences, which included cheating, conspiracy, fraudulent use of forged documents, and offences punishable under Sections 61(2), 316(2), 318(4), 335, 336, 340, and 111 of the BNS read with relevant provisions of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021.
The prosecution contended that permitting default bail on the basis of custody in only the first FIR would defeat the statutory objective of thorough investigation. Moreover, it claimed that Section 187(3) BNSS applied independently to each case and that the statutory period must therefore be computed from the date of arrest in each individual FIR. The State argued that allowing the petitioner’s interpretation could create an anomalous situation where an offender implicated in multiple independent crimes escapes custody merely because they were arrested in one of them first.
Thus, the prosecution prayed for dismissal of the bail application, asserting that default bail could not arise unless the investigation in each case exceeded the statutory period from the date of that case’s arrest and remand.
Court’s Judgment:
Justice N. Tukaramji delivered a detailed judgment rejecting the prosecution’s arguments and granting the petitioner default bail. The Court held that all the FIRs stemmed from a connected chain of events arising out of surrogacy arrangements and thus formed a continuum rather than isolated offences. Although the factual circumstances varied slightly among victims, the underlying criminal design, mechanism, and modus operandi were the same. Therefore, the petitioner’s custody in the first FIR could not be artificially disregarded while computing custody for other connected FIRs.
The Court noted that once the accused is in judicial custody in the primary case, the investigating agency must either show arrest and remand in all other connected cases or justify the absence of such remand. Failure to demonstrate such remand does not provide an advantage to the prosecution but instead accrues to the benefit of the accused. Investigative authorities cannot manipulate statutory timelines by registering staggered FIRs without corresponding arrests.
The Court relied upon Tupakula Appa Rao, affirming that custody is not restricted to a particular crime number when all cases emerge from the same set of operative facts. The court emphasized that statutory bail under Section 187(3) BNSS is a legal right, not judicial discretion. The computation period must begin from the date of first remand and not from subsequently engineered arrests. Justice Tukaramji found that the statutory 90-day period had expired without filing of the charge sheet, and the Trial Court erred by adopting a fragmented approach contrary to settled legal principles.
The Court observed that the Trial Court’s refusal to treat the initial remand date as the operative date defeated the constitutional objective to prevent prolonged detention without charge. The BNSS framework ensures that an accused cannot be kept in custody indefinitely, and judicial oversight over remand periods preserves the fundamental right to liberty. The prosecution’s argument that each FIR should be considered separately was rejected on the ground that it created procedural absurdity—allowing investigating agencies to insulate themselves from statutory deadlines through sequential arrests.
Concluding that the petitioner had acquired an indefeasible right to default bail, the Court granted bail subject to conditions, thereby reaffirming statutory protections embedded in criminal procedure law.