Introduction:

In the case of Biswajith Mandal v. Inspector, Narcotic Control Bureau [Bail Appl. 8581 of 2025; 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 498], the Kerala High Court, presided over by Justice Bechu Kurian Thomas, delivered a significant ruling on the interpretation of the 24-hour production requirement under Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India. The petitioner, Biswajith Mandal, was apprehended by officers of the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) on January 25, 2025, at around 3 p.m., following alleged possession of contraband. However, his arrest memo was prepared nearly 23 hours later, at 2 p.m. on January 26, and he was produced before the Magistrate at 8 p.m. on the same day—amounting to over 29 hours from the time of initial custody. The petitioner challenged this delay, asserting that it violated the constitutional mandate that no person should be detained for more than 24 hours without being produced before a Magistrate. The judgment, which was delivered in a bail application, has far-reaching implications for protecting individual liberty against delayed and unrecorded custodial detention.

Arguments of the Petitioner:

The petitioner, represented by Advocate N. B. Fathima Sulfath, argued that his detention was unconstitutional and illegal as he had been held for more than 24 hours without judicial sanction. It was submitted that the critical constitutional safeguard under Article 22(2) starts from the moment an individual’s liberty is curtailed—whether through physical restraint or submission to police authority—and not merely from the formal recording of arrest. Counsel highlighted that he was effectively detained at 3 p.m. on January 25, but the NCB delayed preparing the arrest memo until almost 23 hours later. The delay in formalising the arrest, according to the petitioner, amounted to an unrecorded period of custody, during which he was under the control of law enforcement without any judicial oversight. This, it was argued, not only violated constitutional rights but also increased the risk of custodial abuse. The petitioner relied on established Supreme Court precedents, including D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal [(1997) 1 SCC 416] and Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. [(1994) 4 SCC 260], which emphasised that the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 must be jealously guarded, and that deprivation of liberty cannot be masked by delaying the recording of arrest. The petitioner also referred to Section 43 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), which recognises that arrest occurs when a person is restrained or submits to police authority, regardless of when an arrest memo is prepared. The Amici Curiae, Advocates Nikhina Thomas and Neha Babu, supported this interpretation and submitted that the “24-hour clock” for production before a Magistrate begins from the time liberty is effectively curtailed.

Arguments of the Respondent:

The NCB, represented by Special Public Prosecutor R. Vinu Raj along with K.K. Subeesh, contended that the petitioner’s arrest and subsequent production before the Magistrate were carried out within the constitutional framework. The prosecution argued that the relevant point from which the 24-hour period should be computed is the time at which the arrest memo is officially recorded, not the moment of preliminary detention during investigation. According to the NCB, law enforcement often needs to conduct initial inquiries and verify evidence before formalising an arrest, particularly in cases involving narcotics offences, which require careful handling of evidence and chain of custody. The prosecution submitted that there was no mala fide intention in the timing of the arrest memo and that the overall period before production was reasonable given the nature of the case. It was further argued that the BNSS provisions do not override established procedural steps in recording arrests and that the arrest was formally recorded within a permissible period when viewed from a procedural compliance standpoint. The prosecution thus maintained that there was no violation of Article 22(2) and opposed the grant of bail on the ground that the accused was involved in a serious narcotics offence.

Court’s Judgment:

After hearing both sides, Justice Bechu Kurian Thomas held that the constitutional safeguard under Article 22(2) must be interpreted in a manner that prioritises the protection of personal liberty. The Court categorically ruled that the 24-hour deadline for producing an accused before a Magistrate begins from the moment a person’s liberty is effectively curtailed, not from the formal time of arrest recorded by the police. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court relied heavily on D.K. Basu and Joginder Kumar, which caution against custodial abuse and stress that any period during which an individual is under the control of law enforcement without judicial oversight constitutes a form of arrest. The Court observed that techniques such as delaying the recording of arrest “under one pretext or the other” can be misused to subject an accused to unrecorded custody, which is a fertile ground for human rights violations, including custodial brutality. Justice Thomas emphasised that “law has to apply equally for all. No man is above the law and none are below it either. Even the most notorious criminal is entitled to be treated with fairness and justice. Fundamental rights have been regarded as the pride of our Constitution and Article 21 as its soul.” The Court further clarified that deprivation of liberty, whether by physical restraint or by the accused submitting to police authority, amounts to arrest as defined in Section 43 of the BNSS. It held that the failure, refusal, or omission to record an arrest—or the continuation of interrogation without recording an arrest—does not negate the fact that liberty has been curtailed. In the present case, since the petitioner had been taken into custody at 3 p.m. on January 25 and was produced before the Magistrate only at 8 p.m. on January 26, the Court found that the 24-hour limit had been breached. The Court also acknowledged the submissions of the Amici Curiae, noting that the interpretation advanced by them aligned with constitutional principles designed to prevent arbitrary detention. The delay in recording the arrest, according to the Court, was unjustified and could not be condoned merely on the ground of procedural or investigative convenience. Accordingly, the Court granted bail to the petitioner, underscoring that such relief was warranted not only because of the statutory breach but also because constitutional guarantees must be zealously enforced. The judgment serves as a strong reminder to law enforcement agencies that fundamental rights cannot be compromised for procedural expediency and that any delay in judicial oversight over detention is inherently suspect.