Introduction:

In a notable judgment delivered in early July 2025, the Bombay High Court refused to initiate contempt of court proceedings against former Maharashtra minister and senior Nationalist Congress Party leader Nawab Malik, who was accused of making defamatory comments about former Narcotics Control Bureau officer Sameer Wankhede and his family. The contempt petition, filed by Sameer’s father Dhyandev Wankhede, was dismissed by a Division Bench comprising Justices Mahesh Sonak and Jitendra Jain. The bench strongly emphasized that defamation suits—not contempt proceedings—are the appropriate remedy, and that Malik’s remarks did not amount to a breach of any undertaking previously given in Court. The decision underscores judicial reluctance to use contempt jurisdiction to quell post-litigation statements and reaffirms the boundaries between defamation law and judicial process.

Arguments of the Petitioner:

Dhyandev Wankhede filed the contempt petition seeking action against Nawab Malik for allegedly violating an affidavit undertaking given in Court on December 10, 2021. In that undertaking, Malik had solemnly pledged not to make any comments about Sameer Wankhede or his family, even in response to media queries. Despite this pledge, Dhyandev alleged that Malik posted a tweet on ‘X’ (formerly Twitter), referring to his son as “Sameer Dawood Wankhede” rather than “Sameer Dhyandev Wankhede.” This alteration, Dhyandev argued, was a deliberate attempt to malign the family’s reputation. He contended that Malik’s act constituted a clear breach of the earlier undertaking and merited the invocation of the Court’s contempt jurisdiction to preserve the sanctity of judicial assurances.

Arguments of the Respondent:

Nawab Malik, through his legal representatives, opposed the contempt petition on multiple grounds. Firstly, they submitted that the tweet in question was made after the defamation suit instituted by Dhyandev had been dismissed on procedural grounds—specifically for non-clearance of office objections—and thus fell outside the ambit of the earlier undertaking. Secondly, Malik’s counsel argued that the affidavit’s scope did not restrict how he referred to Sameer or his family in public discourse post-dismissal, especially in statements falling under satire, commentary, or opinions, rather than in any false or malicious context.

Furthermore, Malik maintained that any dispute relating to potentially defamatory comments should be adjudicated via a civil suit for defamation, not through contempt. They underlined that contempt proceedings are reserved for cases where a person willfully disobeys a court order or undermines judicial authority—not for broader public speech that may be distasteful but not flagrantly contrary to judicial processes or orders.

Court’s Judgment:

Upon hearing the submissions, Justices Sonak and Jain found no grounds to proceed with contempt action. They observed that the tweet referencing Sameer as “Sameer Dawood Wankhede” did not amount to an explicit breach of the court-ordered undertaking, as the affidavit did not prohibit the mention of a middle name nor apply to statements made after the suit’s dismissal. The bench noted: “We have very broad shoulders, you too can have broad shoulders or you have the remedy to file defamation.” This emphasized the judiciary’s position that defamation law—not contempt—is the suitable recourse for reputational harm.

The Court clarified that contempt jurisdiction should not be stretched to encompass every grievance over public remarks, especially where independent legal remedies exist. Contempt proceedings are intended to protect the institution of courts and judicial orders—not to serve as a tool for image protection in ongoing public discourse. By summarily dismissing the petition, the bench left Dhyandev free to pursue civil defamation actions if he believed Malik’s words caused reputational damage.

Finally, the division bench reaffirmed the constitutional principle that free speech and opinion—even if sarcastic or personal—cannot be curtailed through the contempt framework unless they undermine judicial authority or impede the administration of justice.