Introduction:

In the case of Titus v. State of Kerala and Another (Crl.M.C. No. 5751 of 2025), the Kerala High Court, through Justice G. Girish, delivered a crucial ruling on the maintainability of petitions invoking the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), corresponding to the erstwhile Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., to set aside interim orders passed under Section 12(1) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDV Act/DV Act). The petitioner, Titus, filed a Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.M.C.) seeking to quash an interim order passed by the Grama Nyayalaya, Vellanadu, contending that the order was unjust and required immediate intervention by the High Court under its inherent powers. However, the Registry of the High Court raised a defect and refused to number the petition, citing the availability of a statutory appeal remedy under Section 29 of the PWDV Act, which allows any person aggrieved by an order of the Magistrate to prefer an appeal to the Sessions Court within thirty days.

Arguments:

The petitioner, represented by Advocate M.R. Sarin, argued that the interim order of the Grama Nyayalaya was causing him irreparable harm and that the statutory appeal would not provide timely relief. He submitted that the interim order was passed without proper appreciation of evidence and amounted to an abuse of the process of law, justifying the exercise of inherent powers by the High Court under Section 528 BNSS to prevent miscarriage of justice. He further argued that the availability of an alternative remedy should not bar the High Court from exercising inherent jurisdiction in cases where injustice is apparent on the face of the record, citing his right to approach the High Court for redressal of grave procedural irregularities that would render the interim order unsustainable.

On the contrary, the State, represented by the Public Prosecutor, contended that the interim order was passed by the competent Magistrate under Section 12(1) of the PWDV Act after due consideration of the domestic incident report and other relevant materials. The State submitted that the PWDV Act specifically provides an appellate remedy under Section 29, and therefore, the petitioner was bound to exhaust the statutory remedy before invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. The State relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Vijayalekshmi Amma V.K.(Dr.) v. Bindu V. (2010), Naresh Potteries v. M/s. Aarti Industries, and Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal, which laid down the principle that High Courts should exercise inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. sparingly and only in cases of manifest illegality or blatant irregularity in the proceedings. The State emphasized that the purpose of the PWDV Act is to provide timely and effective remedies for women subjected to domestic violence, and frequent interference by High Courts at the interim stage would defeat the legislative intent of ensuring speedy relief to aggrieved women.

Judgement:

After carefully considering the arguments and examining the legal position, the High Court agreed with the Registry’s objection, reiterating the principle that inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS (formerly Section 482 Cr.P.C.) are to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases where there is clear abuse of the process of the court or a glaring illegality. Justice Girish observed that interim orders passed under Section 12(1) of the PWDV Act are part of a special statute designed to protect the rights of aggrieved women and provide urgent relief. The Court noted that the Supreme Court, in the cases cited by the State, had consistently held that unless an interim order suffers from patent illegality or jurisdictional error, the High Courts should refrain from interfering by invoking inherent powers, particularly when the statute provides an appeal mechanism. The High Court remarked that the essence of the law laid down by the Apex Court is that the object of the PWDV Act, which is to provide immediate and effective protection to victims of domestic violence, would be frustrated if High Courts frequently unsettle interim orders by entertaining petitions under inherent jurisdiction without waiting for the statutory appeal process to run its course. The Court specifically observed: “The essence of the law laid down in the aforesaid decisions is that only in cases where there is manifest illegality and blatant irregularity of the proceedings, the High Court will be justified in exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to unsettle the orders passed by the Magistrate under the provisions of the PWDV Act.” It further highlighted the need for courts to show restraint to prevent the misuse of inherent jurisdiction, which could otherwise be used to delay proceedings under the PWDV Act and defeat the very objective of protecting women from domestic violence. Since the petitioner failed to demonstrate any patent illegality or procedural irregularity in the interim order passed by the Grama Nyayalaya, the High Court held that the petition was not maintainable under Section 528 BNSS. The Court clarified that the petitioner had two remedies: either approach the same Magistrate court for modification or setting aside the interim order if circumstances so warranted, or prefer an appeal under Section 29 of the PWDV Act to the Sessions Court. By refusing to entertain the Crl.M.C. and upholding the Registry’s defect note, the Court underscored that the statutory appellate mechanism under the PWDV Act must be respected, and the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal. The Court concluded that allowing petitions like the present one under inherent jurisdiction without exhausting the statutory remedies would set a dangerous precedent and open floodgates for similar challenges, leading to unnecessary delays and undermining the protective framework of the PWDV Act. Accordingly, the petition was directed to be returned to the petitioner, thereby affirming the principle of judicial restraint in exercising inherent powers where statutory remedies are available, and ensuring that the legislative intent of providing swift and effective relief to victims of domestic violence remains intact.