Introduction:

In the ongoing matter before the Bombay High Court, a significant yet complex issue has arisen regarding the claim for stipends by young lawyers enrolled with the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa (BCMG). The Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in question was filed by Ajit Vijay Deshpande in 2021, who, at the time, was a law student. Deshpande sought a directive from the Court mandating the BCMG to pay a monthly stipend of ₹5,000 to young advocates practicing across the state of Maharashtra.

Judgement:

When the matter came up for hearing on June 25, 2025, the division bench comprising Chief Justice Alok Aradhe and Justice Sandeep Marne openly expressed their personal agreement with the sentiment behind the petition. They acknowledged that the issue of financial hardship faced by young lawyers, especially in metropolitan areas like Mumbai, was genuine and that a stipend—even of ₹45,000—would not be unreasonable given the city’s high cost of living. However, the Court was quick to clarify that judicial empathy must be grounded in legal principles and statutory backing. It posed pointed questions to the petitioner’s side: What was the legal right that enabled a young lawyer to claim such a stipend? What was the statutory obligation of the Bar Council to provide financial aid? Without clear legal or constitutional provisions, how could the Court issue a writ of mandamus compelling the Bar Council to pay? These questions framed the core legal tension in the case—between a socially urgent cause and the limits of enforceable rights under public law. The Court also questioned the very classification of the petition as a Public Interest Litigation, noting that the issue pertained exclusively to a particular professional group—advocates—and had little to do with the general public. “What has the public at large to do with the stipend paid to young members of the Bar?” the bench remarked, casting doubt on whether a PIL was the appropriate procedural route. Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged the noble intent behind the petition and expressed sympathy for the struggles of newly enrolled lawyers trying to survive economically while building their practice. In response, the petitioners referred to a Delhi High Court judgment in which directions were issued to the Bar Council of India (BCI) regarding the recommendation of minimum stipends for junior lawyers. The petitioners informed the Court that following the said judgment, the BCI had recommended a monthly stipend of ₹20,000 for junior advocates in urban areas and ₹15,000 in rural areas. However, this recommendation was non-binding and not supported by any statutory or regulatory framework capable of enforcing compliance. Chief Justice Aradhe, while acknowledging the recommendation, reiterated that in the absence of a clear statutory mandate, even a judicially appreciated cause cannot be transformed into an enforceable right. “We agree with you principally but what is the legal basis? How do we give it? BCMG doesn’t have funds…” the Chief Justice said, highlighting the financial incapacity of the Bar Council to meet such demands. The financial aspect of the matter was further elaborated by Advocate Uday Warunjikar, appearing on behalf of the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa. He informed the Court that while some states had been able to roll out stipend schemes through state government support, Maharashtra’s government had refused to allocate any such funding. He added that the Council’s revenue had substantially dropped after the enrollment fee for new advocates was slashed from ₹15,000 to ₹600—a well-meaning but financially constricting decision. This, according to him, had severely limited the Council’s capacity to undertake any stipend distribution on its own. The Court thus appeared caught between a just cause and legal feasibility. It suggested that while the petitioners’ plea was valid in moral and social terms, their prayer for a judicial mandate compelling payment of stipends lacked the required legal footing. The bench did suggest that perhaps the government could step in, or that the petitioners should explore alternative mechanisms, such as structured government schemes, partnerships, or legislative changes that could fund such stipends sustainably. However, it firmly underscored the limitations on its own power in directing financial disbursement by a statutory body without any underlying statutory obligation. The Court’s concern was not limited to legal enforceability but also extended to the financial realities of the Bar Council. Even if a mandate were passed, the actual implementation would be impossible without a sustainable funding model. This pragmatic view reflects the judiciary’s attempt to balance social justice considerations with constitutional limitations and economic realities. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court gave the petitioners two weeks’ time to examine and submit any existing statutory provisions that could be interpreted as creating a legal right in favor of young lawyers to receive a stipend from the Bar Council, or which could impose a corresponding duty on the Council to pay such stipends. The matter was accordingly adjourned. This case raises broader questions about institutional support for young professionals in India’s legal system. While it is well-recognized that junior lawyers face immense financial and professional challenges in the early years of practice, there remains a legislative vacuum in addressing this problem systematically. The Delhi High Court’s involvement, though progressive, is limited to recommendations and cannot create binding obligations in the absence of statutory sanction. Therefore, unless legislative or executive action steps in to institutionalize a stipend structure—possibly through state schemes or a national professional welfare fund—the judiciary remains constrained in granting such relief. Ultimately, the Bombay High Court’s observations reflect a conscientious and empathetic engagement with the issue, while also serving as a judicial reminder that courts must function within the framework of enforceable rights and established legal duties. Without the force of law behind the plea, sympathy alone cannot serve as a foundation for judicial direction. The bench did, however, leave the door open for future developments should the petitioners be able to anchor their claims in statutory language or secure alternative funding routes that could be legally sanctioned. For now, the petition remains a compelling articulation of the systemic hardships faced by India’s youngest legal professionals, pending further legal clarity and institutional support.