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The Legal Affair

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The Legal Affair

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A Supreme Court Clarifies: The Accused’s Right to Appeal Is a Constitutional Safeguard — High Courts Cannot Increase Punishment Suo Motu

A Supreme Court Clarifies: The Accused’s Right to Appeal Is a Constitutional Safeguard — High Courts Cannot Increase Punishment Suo Motu

Introduction:

In Nagarajan v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court of India, in its June 4, 2025 judgment (2025 LiveLaw (SC) 672), delivered through a bench comprising Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, reaffirmed the fundamental right of an accused to appeal against conviction and sentence—and held that this right is not merely statutory, but also a constitutional safeguard. The two-judge bench was considering an appeal emanating from a Madras High Court order in which the High Court, while dismissing the convict’s appeal under IPC Sections 354 (outraging modesty) and 448 (house trespass), concurrently exercised suo motu revision powers under Section 401 CrPC by independently registering revision proceedings. Through this suo motu exercise, the High Court additionally convicted Nagarajan under Section 306 IPC (abetment of suicide) and imposed a harsher cumulative sentence—five years RI plus a Rs 5,000 fine—without any appeal filed by the State, victim, or complainant challenging the trial court’s original acquittal under Section 306. The Supreme Court’s decision arose out of appeals filed by Nagarajan, represented by Mr. M.P. Srivignesh along with co-counsel Lakshman Raja T., Sharavena Raghul ASR, Mithun Kumaar N, Gokul Athithya RP, and Manu Srinath (AOR), while the Crown was represented by Senior AAG V. Krishnamurthy with supporting counsel Sabarish Subramanian, Vishnu Unnikrishnan, Azka Sheikh Kalia, Jahnavi Taneja, Veshal Tyagi, and Danish Saifi.

Arguments Advanced by the Accused (Appellant):

The appellant contended that the High Court, in unilaterally invoking its revisional powers, had transgressed the limits of appellate jurisdiction under Section 386 CrPC. It was submitted that when an accused alone appeals, any exercise of suo motu revision power by the appellate court resulting in harsher punishment or broadened conviction would contravene the principle of reformatio in peius (no one should be made worse off by appealing). The counsel argued that Section 401 CrPC (now Section 442 BNS Act 2023), pertains to revision in the interests of justice—but the substantive statutory prohibition under Sections 386(b)(iii) and 386(b)(iv) prevents enhancement of sentence or addition of new convictions in appeals initiated solely by the accused. The absence of any challenge by the State or complainant to the trial court’s acquittal under Section 306 IPC meant that the High Court lacked the sovereign basis to revisit that judgment or augment the sentence. It was further urged that such judicial action eroded procedural fairness, unduly penalising the convict for exercising his legal right, and that it violated Article 21 by permitting arbitrary sentencing through judicial overreach. The appellant emphasised that the right to appeal was not a subordinate statutory privilege, but a fundamental constitutional right necessary to ensure fair trial and due process.

Arguments Put Forward by the State:

The State counsel, supported by the High Court’s bench, relied on Section 401(4) CrPC to argue that the High Court possessed inherent revisionary jurisdiction to rectify any miscarriage of justice if the trial court’s reasoning appeared flawed. The High Court had reasoned that the trial court had misappreciated evidence, thereby justifying suo motu invocation. The State argued this power was indispensable to ensure justice where the convict’s own appeal did not challenge the acquittal under Section 306, and where no appeal originated from the prosecution. The argument suggested that judicial duty to uphold the integrity of the criminal justice system permitted the High Court to enhance punishment through suo motu revisional powers, even in an appeal filed only by the accused. The State further asserted that reforms in criminal jurisprudence necessitate such methods to prevent impunity where trial findings were patently erroneous or harmful to public interest.

Supreme Court’s Judgment:

The Supreme Court emphatically disagreed with the High Court’s approach, articulating several constitutional and procedural principles:

  • Right to Appeal as a Constitutional Right: The apex court stressed that the right to appeal is “invaluable” and “constitutional,” not simply a legislative concession, since it enables a meaningful second look at conviction and sentence, under both substantive and procedural grounds
  • “No Reformatio in Peius”: Relying on Sections 386(b)(iii)-(iv) and judicial precedents, the Court held that appellate courts cannot worsen an appellant’s position. The High Court’s suo motu enhancement violated this fundamental principle, effectively penalising Nagarajan for exercising his appeal rights .
  • Limitations of Revisionary Power: The Supreme Court reiterated that under Section 401(4) CrPC, while a High Court enjoys revisionary jurisdiction, it cannot convert acquittals into convictions or enhance sentences when no appeal has been filed by the State or complainant. The statutory bar under Section 401(4) expressly prohibits this exercise.
  • Illegitimacy of Suo Motu Conviction under Section 306 IPC: The Court ruled that the High Court’s suo motu conviction was impermissible, because the prosecution or complainant had not contested the acquittal, and there was no revision or appeal triggering such an enquiry. The bench concluded that an appeal filed solely by the accused cannot be converted into a mechanism for increasing punishment or adding new offences.
  • Restoration of Trial Court Judgment (Sections 354 & 448 IPC): As a result, the apex court set aside the High Court’s order insofar as it pertained to charge and sentence under Section 306 IPC, while affirming the original convictions and sentences under Sections 354 and 448 IPC imposed by the trial court.
  • Directing Execution of Sentence: The appellant was directed to undergo the original sentence and pay the fine as determined by the trial court, with the stipulation that, failing surrender, he may be produced before the court for execution of the remitted sentence.

Broad Significance of the Judgement:

This ruling marks a definitive judicial moment, establishing several key jurisprudential propositions:

  1. It elevates the right to appeal against conviction into the core guarantees of constitutional justice, binding not only on courts but on the fundamental structure of due process;
  2. It restrains appellate courts from overstepping their remit and acting as inadvertent prosecutors in appeals initiated solely by the accused;
  3. It reinforces reformatio in peius, ensuring that an appellant cannot find himself in a worse position by seeking redress;
  4. It provides a binding precedent to limit otherwise unfettered High Court revision powers, thereby safeguarding against systemic bias and judicial activism-disguised-overreach;

By citing Sachin v. State of Maharashtra (2025 LiveLaw (SC) 592) and Bombay High Court’s Jyoti Plastic Works judgment, the bench underlined that this decision is part of a broader trajectory in appellate jurisprudence.