Introduction:

In a recent judgment, the Karnataka High Court quashed defamation proceedings against a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court, G. Venkatesh Rao, and his wife, Padma Malini, over a complaint filed by their tenant following a notice asking him to vacate their property. Justice M. Nagaprasanna observed that initiating legal proceedings or issuing a legal notice to vacate does not constitute defamation merely because the proceedings ended in favour of the other party. The Court emphasized that defamation requires an intention to harm the reputation of a person, which was not evident in this case.

Background of the Case:

In 1994, Padma Malini, the owner of a property in Bangalore, leased a portion of it to a company. In 1999, her husband, G. Venkatesh Rao, sent a legal notice to one of the company’s directors, referred to as the respondent, requesting the company to vacate the premises as the lease had expired in 1998. The notice also mentioned that a raid conducted by customs and income tax authorities on the property was prompted by alleged illegal activities of the company.

The respondent filed a suit against eviction, and an interim injunction was passed in his favour. However, in 2013, fourteen years after the legal notice was sent, the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioners alleging defamation. The statement of the respondent was recorded in 2023, over ten years after the registration of the complaint, and the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence in 2024.

Petitioners’ Arguments:

• Limitation Period: The petitioners contended that the offence of defamation under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) is punishable by a maximum of three years imprisonment. Therefore, the complaint filed fourteen years after the alleged defamatory notice, was barred by Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C), which sets a limitation period for taking cognizance of offences.
• Fourth Exception to Section 499 IPC: They argued that the complaint was hit by the fourth exception to Section 499 of the IPC, which states that the publication of reports of court proceedings does not constitute defamation if they are substantially true. Since the legal notice was a private communication and not published publicly, it could not be termed defamatory.

Respondent’s Arguments:

• The outcome of Legal Proceedings: The respondent argued that several proceedings against the company or himself had ended in their favour, implying that the petitioners’ actions had defamed the companies and his image in the eyes of the general public.
• Continuing Cause of Action: The respondent further argued that the cause of action was a continuing one, as the complaint had to be registered after the closure of the proceedings between the parties.

Court’s Observations and Judgment

Upon reviewing the material on record, the Court made several key observations:

• Intention to Defame: To constitute defamation, there must be an intention to harm or knowledge that a statement will harm the reputation of the person about whom it is made. The Court noted that initiating legal proceedings or issuing a legal notice does not amount to defamation merely because the proceedings ended in favour of the other party.
• Publication of Alleged Defamatory Material: The Court emphasized that for a statement to be defamatory, it must be published or made public. In this case, the legal notice was a private communication between the petitioners and the respondent and was not published elsewhere.
• Content of the Legal Notice: The legal notice mentioned that the property was searched by authorities due to certain allegations against the respondent or the company. The Court found that these were factual statements and could not be construed as defamatory.
• Delay in Filing the Complaint: The Court noted the significant delay in filing the complaint—fourteen years after the legal notice was sent—and observed that the Magistrate took cognizance of the complaint without considering the limitation period.
• Magistrate’s Cognizance: The Court criticized the Magistrate’s action of waiting ten years to record the sworn statement and issue process in what appeared to be a frivolous case. It held that the order taking cognizance and issuing process for the offence under Section 500 of the IPC was unsustainable.

Based on these observations, the Karnataka High Court set aside the Magistrate’s order taking cognizance of the respondent’s complaint, effectively quashing the defamation proceedings against the petitioners.