Introduction:

In Sunil Kumar Gupta Alias Sunil Chain Through His Son Akshit Gupta v. Union of India Through Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi and Others, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 86, the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) examined the legality of invoking the National Security Act, 1980 (NSA) against an accused who was already in judicial custody. The Division Bench comprising Justice Abdul Moin and Justice Babita Rani dismissed a Habeas Corpus petition challenging the detention order passed under Section 3 of the NSA by the District Magistrate, Mathura. The case arose from a tragic and disturbing incident in Mathura, where unauthorized excavation and construction work allegedly carried out by the petitioner and his associates near the revered Shree Krishna Janam Bhoomi and Dwarkadeesh Temple led to the collapse of five houses, structural damage to several others, and the death of three persons, including children. The incident triggered widespread panic, law and order concerns, traffic disruption, and deployment of specialized rescue forces such as the NDRF and SDRF. Although the petitioner had already been arrested under Section 105 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), and was lodged in jail, the District Magistrate passed a detention order under the NSA on July 2, 2025, shortly after the petitioner moved a bail application. The central question before the High Court was whether preventive detention under the NSA could be validly ordered against a person who was already in custody. The Court’s detailed 31-page judgment provides a significant reiteration of the principles governing preventive detention and the limits of judicial review over the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.

Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioner:

The petitioner, through his counsel, mounted a multifaceted challenge to the detention order. The primary argument was that the invocation of the NSA was unwarranted and legally unsustainable because the petitioner was already in judicial custody at the time the detention order was passed. It was contended that preventive detention is intended to prevent future acts prejudicial to public order and cannot be mechanically applied to a person who is already incarcerated. According to the petitioner, once he was in jail in connection with a substantive criminal case, there was no immediate threat to public order, and therefore, the extraordinary power of preventive detention was misused. The petitioner further argued that the detaining authority had acted arbitrarily and without proper application of mind. It was submitted that the authority failed to demonstrate compelling reasons to believe that the petitioner would be released on bail and, upon such release, would engage in activities prejudicial to public order. The mere filing of a bail application, it was argued, could not automatically justify preventive detention. Additionally, the petitioner raised the contention that there was an inordinate and unexplained delay in considering and deciding his representation against the detention order, thereby violating his fundamental right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. It was emphasized that the right to make a representation and have it expeditiously considered is a valuable constitutional safeguard in preventive detention cases. The petitioner claimed that the delay vitiated the entire detention process. Furthermore, it was argued that the detaining authority had relied excessively on alleged criminal antecedents without establishing a direct nexus between past conduct and the necessity of preventive detention in the present case. The petitioner urged the Court to scrutinize whether the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate was based on relevant material or was merely a repetition of allegations already forming the subject matter of regular criminal proceedings.

Arguments on Behalf of the State and Union of India:

The State, defending the detention order, argued that Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980, explicitly empowers the detaining authority to pass an order of preventive detention if it is satisfied that such detention is necessary to prevent a person from acting in a manner prejudicial to public order. The State contended that the mere fact that the petitioner was already in custody did not bar the exercise of preventive detention powers, provided the statutory requirements were met. It was submitted that the District Magistrate was fully aware that the petitioner was in jail and had filed a bail application on June 30, 2025. The detention order dated July 2, 2025, was passed after considering the real possibility of his release on bail and the reasonable apprehension that he would resume illegal and dangerous activities upon such release. The State highlighted the gravity of the incident, pointing out that the unauthorized excavation near sensitive religious sites not only led to structural collapse and loss of innocent lives but also created widespread panic and law and order disturbances. The deployment of NDRF and SDRF, traffic congestion, and public unrest were cited as evidence that the incident transcended a mere law and order issue and directly impacted public order. The State further emphasized the petitioner’s criminal history, which included serious offences such as murder and criminal intimidation. It was argued that in previous cases, witnesses and complainants had refrained from coming forward due to fear, demonstrating the petitioner’s influence and propensity to intimidate. The detaining authority, therefore, justifiably formed a subjective satisfaction that preventive detention was necessary to maintain public order. In response to the allegation of delay in deciding the representation, the State submitted affidavits detailing the timeline and steps taken to process the petitioner’s representation. It was contended that there was no callousness or indifference, and the petitioner was also afforded an opportunity to present his case before the Advisory Board, which he duly exercised.

Court’s Analysis and Findings:

The Division Bench carefully examined the statutory framework of the National Security Act, 1980, particularly Section 3, which empowers the appropriate authority to order preventive detention if satisfied that such detention is necessary to prevent acts prejudicial to public order. The Court categorically held that preventive detention can validly be ordered against a person already in custody, provided certain conditions are fulfilled. In reaching this conclusion, the Bench relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India (1990). The Supreme Court in that case had laid down three essential conditions: first, the detaining authority must be aware that the person is in custody; second, there must be reliable material to believe that there is a real possibility of release on bail and that upon such release the person would indulge in prejudicial activities; and third, detention must be considered necessary to prevent such activities. Applying these principles, the High Court found that the District Magistrate had explicitly recorded awareness of the petitioner’s custody status and the pendency of his bail application. The Court noted that the detaining authority had also considered the palpable apprehension among local residents that the petitioner would resume illegal demolition and excavation activities if released. The gravity of the incident, involving deaths and structural collapse near prominent religious sites, was seen as having serious ramifications for public order. The Court distinguished between “law and order” and “public order,” observing that when an act affects the community at large and creates widespread panic and disruption, it falls within the ambit of public order. The Bench further observed that the petitioner’s criminal antecedents were relevant in forming the subjective satisfaction required under the Act. It reiterated that previous conduct and criminal history can be taken into account to assess the likelihood of future prejudicial acts. On the issue of delay in deciding the representation, the Court held that while Article 22(5) confers a valuable right, no rigid timeframe can be prescribed. Delay becomes fatal only when it is unexplained or indicative of indifference. In the present case, the affidavits filed by the authorities demonstrated diligence in processing the representation, and the petitioner was granted an opportunity before the Advisory Board. The Court therefore rejected the contention of unconstitutional delay. Importantly, the Bench underscored the limited scope of judicial review in preventive detention matters. Courts cannot substitute their own opinion for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The judicial inquiry is confined to examining whether relevant material was considered and whether the decision was vitiated by mala fides or non-application of mind. Finding no such infirmity, the Court dismissed the Habeas Corpus petition and upheld the detention order.

Judgment and Conclusion of the Court:

The Allahabad High Court ultimately held that the detention order under the National Security Act, 1980, was legally sustainable. It ruled that preventive detention can be invoked against an accused already in jail if the detaining authority, upon considering relevant material, is satisfied that there is a real possibility of release and a reasonable apprehension of future acts prejudicial to public order. The Court found that the District Magistrate had recorded proper satisfaction based on the gravity of the incident, the petitioner’s criminal history, and the likelihood of renewed illegal activities. The argument of delay in deciding the representation was also rejected. Emphasizing the doctrine of subjective satisfaction and the limited scope of judicial review, the Bench dismissed the petition and upheld the NSA detention.