Introduction:
The case before the Kerala High Court, titled X v. Abraham Mathai and Ors. (WA 1622/2025; 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 541), revolved around the critical interpretation of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition, and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act). A division bench comprising Justice Raja Vijayaraghavan V and Justice K. V. Jayakumar examined whether oral allegations or anonymous complaints could trigger proceedings under the POSH Act, and whether disputes rooted in labour or employment matters could be adjudicated within its framework. The appellant, a former employee of Amstor Information Technology (India) Pvt. Ltd, alleged harassment against the Managing Director (first respondent). After a Local Level Committee (LLC) constituted under the POSH Act recommended compensation and directed structural changes, the District Collector issued compliance orders. The first respondent challenged this on grounds of lack of a written complaint and violation of natural justice. A single judge quashed the proceedings, and the appellant sought redress before the division bench.
Arguments of the Appellant:
The appellant, represented by Advocate R. Anilkumar, contended that she was unfairly denied protection under the POSH Act merely because she had simultaneously pursued remedies under labour laws. She argued that approaching the Labour Court to challenge her termination did not diminish her right to seek redress for sexual harassment. It was emphasized that the POSH Act is a beneficial legislation enacted to provide a safe working environment for women, and its safeguards cannot be denied merely due to the pendency of other legal remedies.
She further submitted that the Local Level Committee was right in entertaining her allegations, since the workplace environment was hostile, and the conduct of the first respondent—including spreading rumours to malign her reputation—constituted harassment. According to her, such hostile acts eroded her dignity at the workplace and thus fell within the wider scope of “harassment.” The appellant argued that procedural technicalities, such as the absence of a written complaint, should not defeat the purpose of the POSH Act, whose very object is to address power asymmetries and barriers women face in reporting sexual harassment.
She also stressed that oral testimonies recorded by the Committee substantiated her allegations, and therefore, the recommendations of the Local Level Committee—including payment of ₹19 lakhs as compensation and establishment of an Internal Complaints Committee (ICC)—were valid. Counsel argued that the High Court should not interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution when alternate remedies existed under the POSH Act itself.
Arguments of the Respondent:
The first respondent, represented by Senior Advocate K. Jaju Babu along with counsels P. Fazil, M. Jayakrishnan, Saju Thaliath, Jayasree Manoj, Jithin Paul Varghese, C. Prathibha, Fadil Fazil, Aswathy Jayachandran, and Akshaya Thomas, countered that the proceedings before the Local Level Committee were wholly without jurisdiction and violative of natural justice. The primary argument centered on Section 9 of the POSH Act and Rule 6 of the 2013 Rules, both of which categorically require a written complaint by the aggrieved woman. The appellant had explicitly disowned the anonymous complaint initially forwarded to the Collector and admitted before the Committee that she had not filed any written complaint. This, the respondents argued, was fatal to the jurisdiction of the Committee.
The respondents further emphasized that the allegations made by the appellant did not meet the statutory definition of sexual harassment under Section 2(n) of the POSH Act. The appellant admitted there was no physical contact, no demand or request for sexual favours, and no sexually coloured remarks. At most, the dispute was one of workplace hostility and labour disagreement arising from her termination, which ought to be addressed by the Labour Court and not under the POSH Act.
It was also argued that the Local Level Committee violated principles of natural justice by recording witness statements over the phone, denying the respondent an opportunity to cross-examine. Citing Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1 SCC 248] and Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner [(1978) 1 SCC 405], the respondents stressed that the denial of cross-examination was a fundamental flaw rendering the entire proceedings void. The reliance on oral statements without procedural safeguards amounted to gross illegality, justifying the intervention of the High Court.
Court’s Analysis and Judgment:
The Kerala High Court division bench, after carefully reviewing the arguments, affirmed the reasoning of the single judge. The Court noted that Section 9 of the POSH Act explicitly requires that an aggrieved woman must file a written complaint within three months of the incident. This requirement is not a mere formality but a substantive safeguard to prevent misuse and ensure due process. The appellant, however, had not filed any written complaint and had instead disowned the anonymous complaint submitted to the Collector, even suggesting that it might have been authored by the respondent himself.
The Court observed that the appellant was clearly capable of filing written complaints, given that she had lodged grievances before the police, the Women’s Commission, and the Labour Court. Her failure to submit a written complaint under the POSH Act therefore could not be excused. The bench categorically ruled that oral statements made before the Committee cannot substitute for the statutory requirement of a written complaint.
On the nature of the allegations, the Court distinguished between sexual harassment and labour disputes. While the appellant claimed she was subjected to hostility, there was no allegation of sexually coloured behaviour, physical advances, or requests for sexual favours. The Court clarified that a hostile work environment or unfair labour practice, absent a sexual element, does not fall within the definition of sexual harassment under Section 2(n) of the POSH Act. To interpret otherwise would dilute the Act’s core objective and improperly expand its scope into areas governed by labour law.
Turning to the issue of natural justice, the Court criticized the Local Level Committee’s conduct in recording witness statements telephonically and denying the respondent cross-examination rights. Relying on Maneka Gandhi and Mohinder Singh Gill, the Court reiterated that cross-examination is a vital facet of the principles of natural justice. The failure to afford this right vitiated the proceedings. This procedural irregularity was not a minor defect but one that went to the root of fairness.
The Court held that this case fell within the exceptions to the alternate remedy rule. Normally, when statutory remedies exist, High Courts do not intervene under Article 226. However, in cases where proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or violate fundamental principles of natural justice, judicial intervention is justified. Here, both grounds were satisfied—the absence of a written complaint rendered the proceedings void, and the denial of cross-examination violated due process.
Consequently, the division bench dismissed the writ appeal, affirming that the findings of the Local Level Committee and the District Collector’s compliance order were unsustainable. The Court thus reinforced the statutory mandate of the POSH Act while ensuring that its scope was not diluted into addressing general workplace disputes.