Factual Background
In the case of Raghavji v. State of M.P. A complaint was made in 2013 under Section. 377 of the IPC against the then-minister Raghavji, the petitioner, stating that for three years the petitioner had engaged in unnatural sex with him in exchange for providing him a job. The impugned FIR was requested to be quashed by the petitioner under Section. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, on the grounds that it was malicious and that Section. 377 of the IPC was not established as the crime at issue.
Issue
- Is there evidence that the petitioner committed an offense under Section 377 of the IPC in the current instance, which is one of consent?
- Whether the complainant’s actions and statements are sufficient to prove that immediate prosecution is malicious?
Analysis of verdict
An FIR filed under Section 377 of the Penal Code, 1860 against the petitioner was dismissed by a single-judge bench led by Justice Sanjay Dwivedi on the grounds that there were little chance of a successful conviction and no good reason to keep the case going.
The High Court can quash a proceeding in the exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC if such a proceeding is “frivolous, vexatious, or oppressive,” the Court observed, noting that while the inherent power and jurisdiction provided under Section 482 of the CrPC must be exercised by the High Court sparingly and carefully with caution, it also gives the High Court the authority to prevent the abuse of court process.
The Court noted that the complainant’s admission regarding the gathering of evidence, the fact that the complaint was made after collaborating with the leaders of rival parties, the complainant’s lack of specificity regarding threats made by the petitioner, or his behaviour as described by his father, who claimed that the complainant is not mentally stable and has a habit of making untrue accusations against prominent members of society, all clearly show that the complaint was made by a third party. The Court dismissed the FIR filed against the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 377, 506, and 34 of the IPC while granting the petition on the grounds that Section 377 of the IPC was not established because it involved consent, and that the petitioner’s prosecution, in this case, was malicious.